Science and truth III
John and I have been continuing an old discussion about science, and I thought I would make it it’s own post, since it has been advancing beyond the original discussion in some ways. John’s comments are in normal font, mine are bolded.
1) I am not not trying to incorporate all of reality into what can be called “science”—I think the question I am trying to suggest is, how do you suppose or even propose to talk about the non-physical? You have a problem doing that! But you want to include God into the discussion—a discussion which has stipulated that only physical items are presently allowed into discussion.
I don’t see what the difficulty is talking about the non-physical. We do it every day when we refer to mental states and their effect on our (partly material) actions. It is, of course, difficult to talk about the non-physical in physical terms, but that’s for obvious reasons.
2) the “that-which-is-available-to-the-senses” I intentionally meant as ambiguous—that it, is I want to include both physical entities not directly present to the senses though inferrable from them and physical entities directly present to the senses. There is no reason for me to be specific. And there is no a priori reason I ought to think that that which is inferrable is God over and above a potentially less understood physical entity.
But there’s also no a priori reason to exclude God from being such a factor. This is the primary point of my original post.
I mean, to reduce it to a “naked-eye” brand of sensation, of course, is not what I properly mean either—I expect there to be sensation-excellerants, i.e., telescopes, microscopes, chemical detectors, etc., apparatuses.
Surely the past is not present to the senses but the memories are and that is the past-present link. Now we can quibble all we want about how we really can trust these recollections, so on and so on, but no one is really going to doubt in the main that recollection is an access to the past or that it cannot be trusted in part. I don’t think that any scientist is really being that strict. That is more a philosopher’s issue.
Well, my original post was one about the philosophy of science, so I’m not agreeing to bracket philosophical questions here. And my point about the past being inferred from the present was not really to raise “sceptical” questions; rather, I was trying to point out that, in general, making inferences to causal explanations from sensible data is already part of what we call “science”, so there is no reason to exclude God from being the result of such inferences unless we are assuming God is not a part of the causal nexus of the universe.
“[I]t equates something having no cause with something having a non-physical cause, which is just to assume the non-physical does not exist.”
You’re wrong about this, and I think you’ve misunderstood me, since you would be thereby assuming that I think only physical things exist. But that is not what I am saying, so I must conclude that your reading of me is not as charitable as it could have been. I’ll try to clarify nonetheless.
1) It is not inconsistent to assume that there are things which cannot be spoken about in terms of physicalities (Kant with his things-in-themselves should have taught us that; or even Pierce, who said there was a difference between things that were actual and thing which existed).
2) I would like to see (independent of the very first thing which supposed came into existence) someone attempt to show that something physical can have no cause.
Again, you’re equating something with having no *physical* cause with something having no cause. No creationist, and no intelligent design supporter, is trying to argue physical things have no cause. In fact, it is usually the opposite: it has been secular thinkers who have tried to deny that certain characteristics of the universe (or the universe itself) have causes.
Also: if you admit that the first thing can come into existence without a physical cause, there seems to be no reason (to me, anyway) to assume such a thing could never happen again.
So why I have to conclude that something which cannot be spoken of necessarily cannot exist is beyond me. The point I am making is that once you have restricted the conversation to that which is physical, to introduce into it a non-physical entity is to put forth a nonsensical, non-physical claim—hence something without reason, without meaning *inasmuch as the conversation goes* (not without meaning or reason generally which is how you are interpreting me)—which was supposed to be thereby excluded from the discussion. Hence it does not function as any proper explanation inasmuch as the conversation is concerned—whether or not (and this is the important part) there is an actual referent to the non-physical entity.
I think you’re missing the context of this discussion. My entire point was that we should not limit the conversation to only allowing physical explanations for physical effects, precisely because science should not rule out possible explanations a priori. I agree it would be nonsensical to admit a non-physical cause into a “science” that was defined by only searching for physical causes, but my point is precisely that we should not even be practicing such a “science” in the first place, because it is just prejudicial. It is by definition less likely to get us to the truth, since it rules out possibly true scenarios before it has even started.
God is more than welcome to effect whatsoever he likes, but if he wishes to be part of the spectrum of science (in its modern sense, if it will make you feel better) he must incorporate himself into the physical. In other words, God is irrelevant to the scientific discussion unless he can make himself observable to it.
It only follows that God is actually irrelevant to the search for the true causes of material phenomena (as opposed to the search for only physical causes, regardless of their being the real causes in history) if God is in fact causally irrelevant to all the physical effects in the universe. God does not have to *be* physical to have an effect on the physical, and if God does in fact have a causal relation to some physical effect he is relevant to understanding that fact.
Your argument will have to demonstrate that design is only possible through a designer and is not a fundamental condition of existence. And that I don’t think you can do without bringing God in through the back door. Even if there is an unexplainable complexity to simple structures it doesn’t follow that there is a creator behind them, it may only follow that basic structures have a fundamental complexity to them. It is only when you add the presupposition that ‘it is not possible for there to be basic complexity without the hand of God’ that you’ll reach your conclusion. But then you’ll have to demonstrate that. However at the same time, and luckily for the theist, a basic fundamental complexity does not exclude God either.
Paley’s analogy is not comparable at all (I bring this in because it was of discussion above and in case you wanted to further argue about design). Thinking that there is design in the world is not like finding a watch and wondering, because of its mechanics, about its creator. If you really want a comparable analogue you’ll have to suppose that it would be like the minute hand of a watch thinking that because there is a second hand which moves that the whole thing in which they are contained must have a designer. Of course that doesn’t really work, or certianly not as well. The presupposition that we can observe the world as whole from within it, as though we were without it, is just from the beginning wrongheaded. But it’s what Paley assumed. Humans might design things but our understanding of their being designed is largely because we can point to designers and the things they design, but the universe doesn’t have a designer we can point to (physically speaking) and therefore we cannot really determine whether it is a thing designed. Order in its parts itself will not tell whether the whole thing is ordered or whether order at all is a necessary condition of there being a God. Because if there is no God, and there is order, then order itself must be a fundamental condition of existence.
It seems to me your fundamental point here is that the design inference does not apply to the universe as a whole, though you do not give a reason why it should not (unless you were doing so when you said “but the universe doesn’t have a designer we can point to (physically speaking)”, which again presumes that a cause must be a physical cause to be a sufficient causal explanation). Let me ask this: do you think SETI is based on a fallacy, because it is attempting to infer the existence of non-human intelligence based on the existence of inter-planetary language transmissions? I think most people would find the logic behind SETI’s method to be common-sensical: if something showing evidence of design exists outside of earth, it is highly likely there is extra-terrestrial intelligence; one does not have to know any other characteristics of that intelligence (such as its metaphysical/physical makeup) in order to rightly infer the existence of such intelligence. Now, if you grant SETI is a reasonable endeavour, why would the same intuition not apply on a cosmic scale?
(As a thought experiment,) what if tomorrow an astronomer somehow observed the edges of the universe (just suppose such a thing exists for a moment), and from his observations realized that the entire universe was in the shape of the following statement written in English in three-dimensional cursive script: “Hey, it’s about time you found the edge of the universe.” In such a scenario, would it be reasonable to infer there was a mind who designed the universe? Again, I think the average person would say yes.
Of course, as you pointed out, it is still logically possible that the universe being in such a shape is just a brute fact, which is equivalent to saying it is by chance. Also, it is logically possible that there is some greater impersonal law that necessitated the universe be in such a shape. But again, I think it is obviously logically intuitive that such explanations are less plausible (*not* impossible, which is what you said I would have to argue above) than the design inference. If you want to question the basic intuition of design, I would say, as you do below: “I don’t see how it shouldn’t be included as part of methodology just because it is not completely philosophically tight”. Also, like the principle of induction, we could not function in society without using this inference all the time (imagine if we refused to believe stop signs were in fact designed…).
Well it is not really a history of science that I am so much concerned with which informs what the present *might be* (not must—no scientist is going to concede to your ‘must’) like, inasmuch as it is about past events dictaing how we think about present and future events. Inasmuch, as that is the case I don’t see what the problem is. Sure, quote some version of the problem of induction to me, that’s really not going to assist with how we generally operate. We don’t exclude the problem of induction either! That present events will presumably be like past ones is not an altogether bad idea—it’s essentially what gets me across the street when I am not at the lights. I recognize this could be the time when I do not succeed, but I am still allowing the past to dictate the future in some regard. I don’t see how it shouldn’t be included as part of methodology just because it is not completely philosophically tight. I also think that science does allow also that such a principle will not always follow. So to assume that an explanation could come about for which God is not needed is alright to assume from the fact that similar situations have happened in the past. Though granted, it should not be absolutely expected that it will. I don’t understand why you are disagreeing with me.
I’m disagreeing with you because of your original statement:
“And I think the reason there might some reason to exclude God as a possible explanation is…”
You’re making the argument that the history of science is a reason to think God is not even a possible explanation for effects in the universe, which is modally speaking the same as saying the history of science probably entails that God must not be a cause. (In a binary situation, where there are only two options, if you say one is not possible you are implying the other is necessary.) My point is that the history of science does not prove that God is not a possible explanation for any physical effect, and so I don’t think it should be part of our scientific methodology to assume every effect must have a non-divine cause. There’s no problem looking for one to some extent, but that doesn’t mean we must never infer that God probably caused something directly.
Let me explain it a little bit differently, perhaps that will help. I think my question is that if it is truly better (from the position of Christianity) for natural phenomena to be explained by recourse to God, why not reject the current ideas concerning thunderstorms, for instance, and take up a causal idea that states that God is angry or bowling or something else? Or why not create explanations for natural phenomenon which have recourse to God though which have been for the most part explained naturally: like God bats the earth around the sun like a tether ball. Why is there a need for God to be an explanation at all?
I think I should clarify my position: I don’t think it is theologically necessary for there to be intra-universal effects which have only God as their cause. I do think, however, that given traditional Christian views of the history of creation (starting with the creation week), we have pretty strong reasons to believe there are some intra-universal effects which do not have strictly natural laws as their cause. For example, if we assume that Adam was created the way Genesis 2 says he was, I think it would be fair to assume there will never be an accurate description of Adam’s origin which is entirely based on the uniform outworking of natural laws (is there really likely to be a natural law that dictated: (1) a pile of dust would form together (2) in the garden of Eden, and that (3) said laws would then somehow (without God’s Spirit being supernaturally involved in anyway) bring that pile of dust to life?). This is not to say there could not be some logically possible natural explanation which could explain the existence of humankind without Genesis being literally true, or without theism being true, but your question here is “why do Christians care so much”, and so perhaps this is part of your answer.
The point is, there is this idea that the less natural phenomena can be explained by God the worse shape theists are in. But, I fundamentally disagree with this (at least inasmuch as Christianity is concerned). I can think that God is the cause of everything without having to believe that individual items in the universal network are caused by him at any given time. Or I can assume that he is the ground of the cause of all things, however, the appearances of which always look as though they were the cause of other natural phenomena. In other words, I can except with little problem that God is truly the cause of every little thing and therefore be consistent with the bible and hence read it just as you do; though on the surface maintain that the causal relations looks quite naturalistic without actually only being so. I can be content with the fact that it is just something I can’t fathom and leave it at that. But you’ll have to assume your way of reading it—in order to exclude mind—is the only possible way to read it. But that is not acceptable by me.
To look at the universe as many Christians do and expect that there have to be or there should be holes in order for God to poke his head through seems to be the product of anxiety not faith. The thing which you defend, if you let go of does not disprove the ground of your belief. I must therefore ask why it is you argue for it. Because you really believe there to be these “scientific peculiarities” which point to God?
Why do I argue for it? Basically because I think it is a good reason for naturalists to give up naturalism. It is basically an external argument focused at unbelievers for me; I do not need it to believe in God’s existence (though it does bolster my faith, which I think is just fine).
City of God 
Andrew, I have an upcoming test, so I’ll try to respond to a few of your comments now, then I’ll probably have to wait till after to respond to others.
“I don’t see what the difficulty is talking about the non-physical. We do it every day when we refer to mental states and their effect on our (partly material) actions. It is, of course, difficult to talk about the non-physical in physical terms, but that’s for obvious reasons.”
I completely agree with you that speaking about the meta-physical or non-physical is something we do on a daily basis. But science-talk is not supposed to be a daily kind of conversation. It has stipulations—namely the sensical. You and I, on the other hand, can speak about God all we want (and it is in a certain sense valid), but that is because what grounds our discussion is a mutual belief in God. Science has not granted that stipulation because a belief in God is not held by all parties involved. We do use “material” expressions when we speak of God, but we recognize that this is just a manner of speaking.
“But there’s also no a priori reason to exclude God from being such a factor. This is the primary point of my original post.”
If you read me carefully, I am not excluding God as a factor. I am only stipulating that if he wishes to be a factor he must subsume himself under the conditions of the discussion—i.e., the sensuous conditions. That is not an a priori exclusion. Remember if it is the case that not everyone will believe in God, there must be some common ground between all the participants of the discussion—and that common ground is sensation.
“. . . I was trying to point out that, in general, making inferences to causal explanations from sensible data is already part of what we call “science”, so there is no reason to exclude God from being the result of such inferences unless we are assuming God is not a part of the causal nexus of the universe.”
I agree, there would be no reason to exclude God—unless he does not meet the stipulations of the conversation (which inasmuch as he remains non-physical he does not), or if it was impossible for a physical explanation to do the work and for a physical explanation to ever be at any time derived. The assumption is never—God is not a part of the causal nexus of the universe—but that only that if anything is to be a cause it must be identifiably physical. A non-physical cause has no sense—by definition! If it is not identifiably physical it doesn’t follow, however, that it doesn’t exist (or as Pierce would want, it isn’t actual).
“Again, you’re equating something with having no *physical* cause with something having no cause. No creationist, and no intelligent design supporter, is trying to argue physical things have no cause. In fact, it is usually the opposite: it has been secular thinkers who have tried to deny that certain characteristics of the universe (or the universe itself) have causes.”
Again, you are trying to wiggle in your own definition of “cause” which the conversation has ruled out from the beginning. Science is interested in that which can be sensed—or that was the working definition anyway. Thus science is interested in physical causing physical, but what you are saying is that it should make room for non-physical causes too, which is just to say that the conversation of science should include non-physical entities—which the scientific conversation is supposed to have ruled out. I am not denying that it is impossible for something non-physical to effect the physical—I am only saying that what science is interested in is the physical effecting the physical. It is not unfair if they make that stipulation unless they come up against something in which it is impossible to give a physical explanation for. The problem is I don’t actually think that that has been done or can really be done.
Assume there is some physical phenomenon for which no physical explanation at present can be given; it stands to reason that:
a) it is divinely caused
b) it is physically caused (though no explanation has been given)
The very fact that people have been stumped in the past only to have come to understanding in the future entails that accepting a) may be premature and therefore undesirable. Since science is interested in the physical it then becomes quite acceptable either to suspend one’s judgment until such a time that a physical explanation can be given. It never follows that one is pressed to give a non-physical explanation because the future always holds the possibility that one could come about and also because the nature of or the stipulations set up about the conversation (i.e., that concerns the physical) entails that it will wait for a physical explanation.
“My entire point was that we should not limit the conversation to only allowing physical explanations for physical effects, precisely because science should not rule out possible explanations a priori. I agree it would be nonsensical to admit a non-physical cause into a “science” that was defined by only searching for physical causes, but my point is precisely that we should not even be practicing such a “science” in the first place, because it is just prejudicial. It is by definition less likely to get us to the truth, since it rules out possibly true scenarios before it has even started.”
Once you done that however, you opened up there being any explanation at all for any physical event. ‘The purple monkey caused it’—obviously I’m being facetious. But the point is science is restricted to physical and physical causation because it is the only ones that all persons evaluating the material have access to. How does the next scientist test ‘it was caused by God’? This become problematic. As long as it is physical there is (while maybe not no difficulty) certainly less difficulty in testing hypotheses.
I cannot accept that we should not be practicing such sciences in the first place. I don’t deny that it is prejudicial—but it is certainly not pejoratively prejudicial. If the scientific community wants to restrict the conversation to items of the senses, I have no problem with that. But it better, then, not make claims about items for which it has no jurisdiction. The scientist who says that science proves God and the scientist who says that science disproves God are both wrong—because they are extending themselves farther than their own stipulations allow them to reach.
Truth may be absolute, but it can be restricted. If I ask is it true that Romeo fell in love with Juliette, we could say no or yes, depending on what we restrict the truth to be for our purposes. Science is doing a similar thing. It’s narrowing down a field of study and asking what is true about it. It cannot speak for all truth—only the truth for which it speaks.
“[I]f God does in fact have a causal relation to some physical effect he is relevant to understanding that fact.”
But in terms of the stipulations set about by science, this would only be true if God could be understood physically. Otherwise, you make science stipulate more than it wants to. Otherwise he is irrelevant—not because he hasn’t really caused a physical effect—but because he cannot be identified as physical.
“It seems to me your fundamental point here is that the design inference does not apply to the universe as a whole, though you do not give a reason why it should not (unless you were doing so when you said “but the universe doesn’t have a designer we can point to (physically speaking)”, which again presumes that a cause must be a physical cause to be a sufficient causal explanation).”
All do this in reverse order:
Once again, one does not have to deny the fact non-physical entities can cause either other non-physical entities or physical ones. I am not making that claim. I am saying that *inasmuch as the scientific conversation is concerned* what science is concerned with is physical effecting physical—it is not saying that it is impossible for the non-physical to effect the physical. The only way for the non-physical to enter into the conversation is if and only if it is impossible either presently or in the future to explain the situation without a non-physical entity.
I am not saying that the design inference doesn’t apply to the whole universe but that we cannot step outside the universe to see if there is any design at all. So whether there is or is not is just not a question we can answer. I can see how it works in part, but I cannot see how it works as a whole. Paley’s analogy, I said before, assumes that we can, and therefore his argument presupposes the conclusion he wants to show. Unless you give me an example of how we have stepped outside—I am just not take analogies to do the work that actual observations need to do.
On an aside, I do think that the design argument can help—and if someone came to God because he or she was convinced by it, then great! I don’t think it is philosophically secure, though. Neither would I express my dissatisfaction with except with persons who were mature enough.
I think what I have difficulty with is the soundness of your conditional—”if something showing evidence of design . . .” My question is what is it for something to show evidence for design? I really don’t think you are doing this without slipping God in the back door. It will have to be something very plainly laid out.
“(As a thought experiment,) what if tomorrow an astronomer somehow observed the edges of the universe (just suppose such a thing exists for a moment), and from his observations realized that the entire universe was in the shape of the following statement written in English in three-dimensional cursive script: “Hey, it’s about time you found the edge of the universe.” In such a scenario, would it be reasonable to infer there was a mind who designed the universe? Again, I think the average person would say yes.”
I would say “yes” too!
“Of course, as you pointed out, it is still logically possible that the universe being in such a shape is just a brute fact, which is equivalent to saying it is by chance.”
There is definitely a logical equivalence. But it is not the same thing as saying the other. If it were something I was saying, I would have said just that. But I’m not. The point is the universe can look as though it were the product of blind chance, but it still can be the case the God exists.
I agree that it is intuitive to think that there is a God (a designer), but not logically so—it’s not a logical derivation from design—it is more a product of our ability to sympathize, personify, and extrapolate, which to me seems more like products of emotion than of intellectual and logical rigor.
There has to be an intuitiveness as regards God, I think, otherwise universally speaking, not every culture would have such a concept.
“You’re making the argument that the history of science is a reason to think God is not even a possible explanation for effects in the universe . . .”
No. If you’ve read me carefully you’dve noticed that I am not (nor is the history of science) excluding God as a possible explanation. The point has always been that if God wishes to be considered as an explanation he must do so under the stipulations set out by the test.
“My point is that the history of science does not prove that God is not a possible explanation for any physical effect, and so I don’t think it should be part of our scientific methodology to assume every effect must have a non-divine cause. There’s no problem looking for one to some extent, but that doesn’t mean we must never infer that God probably caused something directly.”
If it is the case scientific methodology concerns itself only with the physical, would you think that it was allowable for effects to have non-divine causes?
“Why do I argue for it? Basically because I think it is a good reason for naturalists to give up naturalism. It is basically an external argument focused at unbelievers for me; I do not need it to believe in God’s existence (though it does bolster my faith, which I think is just fine).”
I think scientists get accused of similar things that Christians do. Christians do something bad or something of the sort and one labels all Christians as having similar thoughts or doing similar things. I think your problem, inasmuch as it is against naturalists, is with “scientists” who are not doing science properly but who are assumed to be doing it properly anyway.
It has stipulations—namely the sensical. You and I, on the other hand, can speak about God all we want (and it is in a certain sense valid), but that is because what grounds our discussion is a mutual belief in God. Science has not granted that stipulation because a belief in God is not held by all parties involved. We do use “material” expressions when we speak of God, but we recognize that this is just a manner of speaking.
This is interesting, I think, but wrong-headed. Why should our search for truth be determined by what other people are prepared to accept? There are people in the world for whom the material world is an illusion, and thus people who believe it is real have no common ground with them. Should modern science stop researching because some people believe the material world does not exist? Obviously not, right?
Since science is interested in the physical it then becomes quite acceptable either to suspend one’s judgment until such a time that a physical explanation can be given. It never follows that one is pressed to give a non-physical explanation because the future always holds the possibility that one could come about and also because the nature of or the stipulations set up about the conversation (i.e., that concerns the physical) entails that it will wait for a physical explanation.
I was thinking about this after my last post, and thought of a parallel which I think disproves this point. Currently (as far as I know), the big bang theory is believed to be probably the correct account of the origin of the universe. At the same time, I doubt any scientist would say it is absolutely impossible further empirical investigation could disprove such a theory. Yet, scientists still hold that it is reasonable to hold that the big bang theory is probably correct. Now, substitute “divine creation” for “big bang theory”, and ask: would the possibility of something disconfirming the design inference in the future mean it was not right to make such an inference now?
Once you done that however, you opened up there being any explanation at all for any physical event. ‘The purple monkey caused it’—obviously I’m being facetious. But the point is science is restricted to physical and physical causation because it is the only ones that all persons evaluating the material have access to. How does the next scientist test ‘it was caused by God’? This become problematic. As long as it is physical there is (while maybe not no difficulty) certainly less difficulty in testing hypotheses. I cannot accept that we should not be practicing such sciences in the first place. I don’t deny that it is prejudicial—but it is certainly not pejoratively prejudicial.
Well, to some degree design alone cannot tell us the identity of the designer, but intelligent design advocates concede that. They concede it is possible that panspermia, for example, explains the origins of life on earth rather than divine creation. But your broader concerned is answered by them: “How does the next scientist test ‘it was caused by God’?” Easy: is there evidence that a mind designed life? Look at life and see.
It’s narrowing down a field of study and asking what is true about it. It cannot speak for all truth—only the truth for which it speaks.
But according to you it is doing more than that. It is (a) focusing on one aspect of reality to study, and as well (b) restricting itself to only certain kinds of explanations for that reality. (a) is entirely reasonable, (b) is not if what they are really after is the *true* causes of reality, since we cannot stipulate beforehand what kind of explanations are the correct kind and at the same time be claiming to do research based strictly on observation (rather than imposing preconceptions beforehand).
The only way for the non-physical to enter into the conversation is if and only if it is impossible either presently or in the future to explain the situation without a non-physical entity.
Well, this is exactly what the ID movement claims to have demonstrated: *at present* it is extremely implausible to explain the situation without a non-physical entity. That’s exactly what the evidence of the irreducible complexity of the cell and the fine tuning of the universe is presented to do.
I am not saying that the design inference doesn’t apply to the whole universe but that we cannot step outside the universe to see if there is any design at all. So whether there is or is not is just not a question we can answer.
I’m not sure why our vantage point is relevant to the design inference. Let’s try another very silly thought experiment: imagine you and I are inside a giant wristwatch. We look around and see that we are in a wristwatch, though we are seeing it from the inside rather than the outside. If it is right to infer design from a small wristwatch we observe from the outside, why would it be wrong just because of our physical location or the size of the watch? Those seem to be irrelevant to design inference.
My question is what is it for something to show evidence for design? I really don’t think you are doing this without slipping God in the back door. It will have to be something very plainly laid out.
This is an excellent question! William Dembski has attempted to formalize this mathematically and logically in his work (Google it), but I think you already intuitively know the answer (we all do) insofar as you admit you would say “yes” to my previous silly thought experiment about the universe being in the shape of handwriting. You already intuitively know what design looks like. And the inference presupposes nothing about God: Paley’s watch, and SETI, prove this (inferring design in either of those cases implies nothing in particular about God’s existence, just about the existence of an intelligence, period).
If it is the case scientific methodology concerns itself only with the physical, would you think that it was allowable for effects to have non-divine causes?
Well, obviously not. But my entire point has been to challenge this methodology as less likely to lead us to the truth than one which allows the possibility of non-physical explanations.
“I was thinking about this after my last post, and thought of a parallel which I think disproves this point. Currently (as far as I know), the big bang theory is believed to be probably the correct account of the origin of the universe. At the same time, I doubt any scientist would say it is absolutely impossible further empirical investigation could disprove such a theory. Yet, scientists still hold that it is reasonable to hold that the big bang theory is probably correct. Now, substitute “divine creation” for “big bang theory”, and ask: would the possibility of something disconfirming the design inference in the future mean it was not right to make such an inference now?”
It is not exactly clear to me here what your point is, so you might have to correct me.
1) If I substitute “big-bang theory” for “divine creation” I don’t think I would believe the paragraph anymore.
2) The design inference, as far as I know appeals to the non-physical necessarily–so as far as science goes it would be ruled out until such a time when it was demonstrated as impossible that any other explanation could suffice. As far as I understand the big-bang theory it either is saying that the thing before it (if you will allow me that) is caused or not-caused. If it is caused then one could find grounds for stipulating a God, or, I think, if I’ve been told properly, some of the string-theory conclusions or infinite regress ideas. If it is not caused . . . we’ll then we can’t say anything.
John,
I think I’m going to let my previous response be my last for now. I know I often seem to be leaving conversations with you in the middle of them because of outside stuff, but I’m supposed to be writing a thesis right now, and this very interesting discussion is giving me cause to procrastinate.
Blessings
“This is interesting, I think, but wrong-headed. Why should our search for truth be determined by what other people are prepared to accept? There are people in the world for whom the material world is an illusion, and thus people who believe it is real have no common ground with them. Should modern science stop researching because some people believe the material world does not exist? Obviously not, right?”
First of all, I am not saying our search for truth should be always in every way according to what others are prepared to accept. When you and I discuss theological *truths* for instance, I take as our groundwork the mutual belief in God, which is something that other poeple are not prepared to accept. And for those who cannot accept a belief in God as the ground for theological discussion, well they’re just not welcome into the conversation.
Science has its groundwork in the physical or that which can be ascertained by the senses. Thus everyone who is will to accept that as part of the procedural method of doing science is welcome to it. So it is unclear to why science would cease to make further examinations of the world because of persons who believe that the world is illusory.
About the material world as illusion (I take it you are speaking about Buddhists among others). Do these people interact with the “illusory” world as we do? I mean relatively speaking. Do they put illusory things they call ‘food’ into their illusory mouths, with illusory things called hands, arms and cutlery. Are the sounds which come of out of their illusory mouths illusory too? Is the sound which approximates “the material world is an illusion” illusory too? It interesting that people who claim that the world is illusory their whole lives act really no different from those who think the world is real.
But why should we accept what others think to be true? How else are we able to agree about what the truth is or how it ought to be sought if there isn’t some agreement in method–which is just what science is. If there isn’t an agreement how do you plan to get away from people making claims like, “well that’s your truth, but it isn’t mine.” You are advocating, or would be advocating an absolute exclusive method of discerning truth, when inclusive methods are readily available–such on the ground that all men sense or the belief in God. I don’t see the point of that. Once, you have compartmentalized different ways of accessing truth so individually (for that could then mean that truth for me is ‘whatever I think is true’) rationalizing with people, proving them wrong, becomes impossible.
Even the people who think the world illusory may be able to do ‘science,’ in our meaning of it, even if they think in the end that it is all illusory. Berkeley for instance wasn’t trying to show that science was impossible. He maintained that it was still very possible (though not in so many words). They would have to admit that even the illusory world operates according to illusory laws, for instance, and that science was just the study of the illusory world, but these would be minor equivocations. All the principles otherwise would be the same.
The last thing you mention is somewhat strange to me, since I am
i just read quickly your discussion and i would just like to say this. if you want to put a supernatural beeing like God as a cause of any phenomenon or the entire universe for tha matter then you will have to prove it somehow or at leaste raise some strong evidence into this direction. But in reality how could you? well only in such a case like you described with the edge of the universe or something of similar nature. But nothing like that has emerged so far.sciense on the other hand is not prepositioned and i will prove it. When Neuton found and described the power of gravity he used mathematical language and experiments to back it up. so it was proven that there was a force like act like that and we could even measure its effects in our world. Neuton wasnt prepositioned about it. He didnt say i believe there is gravity without backing it up. he just did what any scientist would do. he proved it. He could have named the force “The force that gets you down” and it still wouldnt matter because the real point was proving the existence of the phenomenon not the name or origin. Now if Neuton says i have proven gravity and so i have proven the existence of god because he created it thats a whole different story. because the one proof doesnt nesseceraly leads to the second. in other words and excuse my english (im greek) proving the effects of a phenomenon and even the composition of the force that produses them cant be tied together with a creator. the creator must be proved on its own. thats sciense. So if some astronomer saw one night a far awat galaxy and written on it the phrase “God exists. Im here you morons” then he would have a very strong evidence. But still we would have to go there to be absolutely sure:)
Hi, Kostas,
I’m not sure whether Andrew’s still writing his Thesis so he may not answer at all, but it seems to me your comments are more directed to him than they are me. I’ll answer for him (though he can correct me if he disagrees).
I don’t really think Andrew wants to prove God’s existence through science. He is merely maintaining that where natural explanations fail you cannot rule out a supernatural one. I agree with him; I just don’t think science is the kind of thing that is ever going to require a supernatural explanation. He is not trying to prove God, he’s only saying that if you assume God’s existence (and there is no reason not to), God can become a potential reason/explanation for natural phenomena. The proofs for the existence of God are an issue entirely separate from the one we are/were discussing.
I am still writing my thesis, but am failing miserably at keeping myself from distractions, so I have no real justification for ignoring this.
Firstly, John’s most recent reply to me: if you don’t mind, I’m going to restrict my reply to what I think is the most significant issue in our discussion:
“But why should we accept what others think to be true? How else are we able to agree about what the truth is or how it ought to be sought if there isn’t some agreement in method–which is just what science is. If there isn’t an agreement how do you plan to get away from people making claims like, “well that’s your truth, but it isn’t mine.” You are advocating, or would be advocating an absolute exclusive method of discerning truth, when inclusive methods are readily available–such on the ground that all men sense or the belief in God. I don’t see the point of that. Once, you have compartmentalized different ways of accessing truth so individually (for that could then mean that truth for me is ‘whatever I think is true’) rationalizing with people, proving them wrong, becomes impossible.”
My original point, if I recall correctly, was that we should not adapt our method in a restrictive direction because of what some people think is impossible or contra-factual. That is, we should not begin our scientific investigation of the sensible world with the assumption that its features would never imply a designer. That has been my point all along. It is precisely the methodological materialist who is advocating the “exclusive” method, not the non-materialist. I see no reason, from a pragmatic point of view with our goal being the ascertaining of the truth (and not just the ascertaining of the most plausible exclusively materialistic explanation), to accept the prejudice of methodological materialism/naturalism. If materialists want to do that kind of science, they are free to it, but I maintain they are being irrational from a pragmatic point of view.
kostas:
One of your most pertinent points was here:
“if you want to put a supernatural beeing like God as a cause of any phenomenon or the entire universe for tha matter then you will have to prove it somehow or at leaste raise some strong evidence into this direction. But in reality how could you? well only in such a case like you described with the edge of the universe or something of similar nature. But nothing like that has emerged so far.”
Well, actually, it has. It’s called the fine tuning of the universe. That evidence is so obvious that materialists have been forced to postulate an infinite number of other universes we have no direct evidence for in order to explain it. But the design inference is more reasonable, just like it is more reasonable when we find a watch in a desert, or if SETI were ever to receive verbal communication from extra-terrestrials.
As for your comments direct at me, Andrew; I have no real problem with what you say as long as you don’t mean by “science” what “methodological materialism/naturalism” means. My point has always been that science is something that comes between both assuming a creator (maybe roughly your position) and not allowing one (methodological materialism). Either position assumes something not observable according to the method of “science.” I am in full agreement with you however when it comes to those “scientists” who a priori rule out God.
John:
From an earlier comment:
“2) The design inference, as far as I know appeals to the non-physical necessarily–so as far as science goes it would be ruled out until such a time when it was demonstrated as impossible that any other explanation could suffice.”
We need to parse out the “necessarily” here. It is logically necessary that in the case of design the cause is non-physical, but that’s just because (as a materialist will NOT grant) minds are not physical.
But it does not appeal to the non-physical as the cause only in the case that it is logically necessary that no physical cause could be the explanation. In other words, it is not necessary to prove all other explanations to be logically impossible. All it has to do, just like any other causal explanation, is to prove it is the most likely explanation for us to be obligated to believe it.
Given that, I can’t see any non-arbitrary way that my points about the big-bang would not follow for divine creation.
How would you determine between whether a natural explanation was better than a God explanation? It seems that if science is interested in how the physical world functions, physical explanations are always to take priority over non-physical. But you are calling this into question.
Remember this. Finish your thesis. Come back to it later.
Well, okay, I’ll try again to be good and do my real work, but before I go here’s one last response:
1) We would know a design explanation was better than an impersonal-law explanation if there is evidence of design. Just like SETI or my absurd universe-in-the-form-of-a-message example. Someone could, logically speaking, explain my universe-message example by means of the multiverse hypothesis, but it’s intuitively obvious that the design explanation is more reasonable.
2) To make this more down-to-earth, and from an intra-Christian point of view: I assume at some point in your life you have had an “answer to prayer”. How did you recognize it as such? The same criteria that implicitly allowed you to recognize an answer to prayer are the ones that would allow us to recognize design on a cosmic scale, or anywhere else in the universe, for that matter.