Dale Tuggy vs. James Anderson on mystery
Dale Tuggy at trinities has just reviewed Anderson’s work, mentioned in my posts on the Trinity.
His one significant argument against Anderson is that the incomprehensibility of God does not make it more likely than not that we will encounter apparent contradictions in our view of God, so that that contradictions are still a defeater for a doctrine.
My thought: if the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility makes it possible that there would be something about God apparently contradictory, then Andersons’ full argument (which includes the proviso that there’s nothing about incomprehensibility which requires that any paritcular doctrine be apparently contradictory) still would seem to stand. If the incomprehensibility of God makes it possible that an apparent contradiction would arise, we can’t rule out an apparently contradictory doctrine just because it is such. It just means that we must actually show that the currently available non-contradictory explanations of the apparent contradictions are somehow not orthodox or biblical (i.e., that they contradict something else God has revealed). With that empirical evidence, along with our knowledge about the incomprehensibility of God, it seems to me that believing in apparent contradictions is reasonable.
This means that we would only have probablistic reasons to believe in apparently contradictory doctrines, but I don’t see this as a problem for Anderson’s thesis, nor for ordinary human life.
Hi Andrew,
I’d say: be careful. It can’t be that just any old apparent contradiction is worthy of belief, not even if there’s *some* reason to think it divinely revealed.
What if we discovered tomorrow, say, what seem to be a few lost verses of 1 Corinthians. Let’s say they’re even confirmed by some patristic quotations. And they say: “Yes, brothers, God does exist, but even so, God does not exist.” There’s an apparent contradiction for you. But even despite its credentials (we’re supposing) as a divine revelation, it seems we ought not believe it. (I’d probably withhold on (1) whether it was really such a lost verse, and/or (2) on what Paul meant by it, supposing he did pen it,)
Don’t we need something to separate the sheep from the goats? What do you think?
Hey Dale, thanks for the comment!
A few things:
If, ex hypothesi, this lost verse was divine revelation, wouldn’t we have an obligation to believe it?
Your points for questioning whether it would be revelation are valid, but I don’t think they contradict my or Anderson’s point. Our reasons for holding to apparently contradictory doctrines will only ever be probablistic (because maybe tomorrow someone will figure it out). But if there is no easy way out like in your hypothetical scenario (the evidence for the main pillars of Trinitarian doctrine are far more stable textually than that, etc.), then I just think we can’t say it’s unreasonable to rest with the apparent contradiction.
Part of what made Anderson’s thesis so convincing to me was that he was able to show all the main rational reconstructions were heretical/problematic in some way, and in fact all the imaginable ways, at present, of reconstructing it are problematic. He provided both sides of the case: God’s incomprehensibility at least allows the possibility that there might be something apparently contradictory revealed to us, AND it appears that this is the case in the cases of both the Trinity and the Incarnation (and according to him, providence/free-will). I don’t think he tried to argue for anything stronger than that (i.e., that somehow certain doctrines MUST be contradictions; how would one even apply that principle/prediction to specific cases?).
Thanks for all the great work at your site; it’s greatly appreciated by this (amateur) theologian!
Hi guys,
A quick response to Dale’s hypothetical.
If such a verse were discovered (and assuming its authenticity) I would be strongly inclined to seek a plausible non-metaphysical (e.g., figurative or rhetorical) interpretation, because it’s only one verse, the two ’sides’ of the paradox are found together within that one verse, and it’s stated so baldly. The verses taken to support the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity are not at all like that. There are stacks of them, expressed in various ways, in various places by various authors, such that it’s pretty hard to resolve the paradox merely by appeal to literary devices.
Moreover, as I suggest in chapter 7, one of the criteria for a legitimate appeal to mystery is that the presence of the paradox must be plausibly attributable to divine incomprehensibility. Such is the case for the Trinity and the Incarnation. But it’s not clear how the appearance of God both existing and *not* existing can be put down to divine incomprehensibility! I mean, doesn’t divine comprehensibility *presuppose* the existence of the incomprehensible divinity? (No, I don’t swallow Plotinist ideas about God transcending existence…)
I admit in the conclusion of the book that it’s difficult to identify hard-and-fast criteria for when acceptance of a paradox is exegetically warranted. You have to take it case by case. But that said, just because I don’t know where grey starts and finishes doesn’t mean I don’t know black and white when I see them — and I think the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation come as close to black-and-white as any biblical doctrines.
Typo: “divine comprehensibility” should be (of course) “divine incomprehensibility”!
Hi Gents,
Sorry for the delay.
Yes, James, I’d try the non-literal route too, but I assume that wouldn’t be too promising for “exists”.
I’m probably even more down on the neo-platonic “beyond existence” (i.e. neither existing nor not existing – or worse yet, both) junk.
As to an obligation to believe the imaginary passage. Sure, if it is divinely revealed then on the face of it I must believe it. But that seems more than counter-weighed by the apparent contradiction. I’d be more likely to say that this bit of 1 Corinthians was uninspired than that it was true. But like I said above, I think I’d just say I don’t know what Paul meant (perhaps leaving the door open to a non-literal reading).
This isn’t the time or place to discuss it, but I think ya’ll are placing way too much confidence on the standard arguments allegedly logically deriving the Trinity from the Bible. All I can say now is that I’ve seen several modern-era people massively take down such arguments on the basis only of non-controversial logical points, and other contents of the Bible. I think it can be shown that the Trinity isn’t logically implied by the Bible – at best, it’ll be the hypothesis which best explains what the Bible does teach. (I say a bit more about this in my forthcoming SEP “Trinity” piece…)
“But like I said above, I think I’d just say I don’t know what Paul meant (perhaps leaving the door open to a non-literal reading).”
That seems like an admission of mystery, just like James’ position is advocating…?
As for the Trinity not being implied by the Bible… well, I’ll believe that when I see it
OK – I’ll take that last part as a promise.
No – saying “I don’t know what Paul means here” is what I call withholding – it’s different than believing what he says, and defending it as a mystery (rationally believed apparent contradiction, or a nearly unintelligible claim).
OK, fair enough, but I have one thought:
I don’t think it would be epistemically realistic to say you had no idea what Paul meant; you know what the words “God”, “exist”, and “not exist” mean, etc.
If you combine that “formal” understanding with a commitment to believing that whatever Paul meant was true, you’re pretty close to what Anderson was saying…
I thought about it a bit more:
I don’t think you can actually say you have no idea what Paul means, because you have understood the hypothetical passage enough to deduce that it is contradictory. So really the only relevant issue is whether you are committed to believing it is true, or not… if you are, then I think you’re in the same position as James.