Posted by: Dan | May 5, 2008

Derrida on Atheism and Belief

This is a fascinating bit of audio from Jacques Derrida.

Does anyone find that this is true? It reminds me about how Dostoevsky, at the end of his life, commented that his faith was not like that of a child because it had passed through the “crucible of doubt.”

Responses

I know this might ruin the effect, but for the sake of us who have slow connections, could you maybe give the gist of what he says?

I want to be careful here since Derrida has a very, uh, unique way of using language sometimes. The essence of what he’s saying is that the true believer is carrying out a project of radical atheism in testing his or her belief. If the believer is not doing this, then belief is naive according to Derrida.

I don’t know if that really does it justice, I’ll keep looking for a transcript that I can link to or something.

I think that what he is saying is interesting. He is claiming that the real believer is different from the naive believer. The naive believer constructs an image of God and worships that image as God. The real believer does not worship that image. He believes that any image one might create of God is not God. In that way, he is an atheist. However, he has faith that he is believing in a real being, although one beyond himself in every way.

I completely paraphrased and restructured what he said, but I think that is what he was saying. It appears that he is rejecting the view of Aquinas that divine attributes are analogous to what is said in human language. Instead, that language is equivocal.

What sums it up for me is at the end Derrida says:

Who can know if they are a believer? Who can know if they are an atheist?

He seems to have a problem with allowing the individual to come to conclusions about themselves (I do not think he is drawing a conclusion about the more obvious problem of knowing if one’s conceptions are actually correct).

But if there is anything we can know — even if we can know only in quiet isolation — it is our intention and the intended objects of intention.

We can know both what intentions we effect and to what that intention reaches out to (even if the object of intention is fiction). As a Being, it is not only one of the few things we can know and know absolutely, but I would say that this fact is the very foundation for Being.

Ben,

If you take Derrida’s reasoning on the matter, this is a special case. Do you believe in God or in your idol of God? How do you know?

Right, I know that was the bulk of his point. I think that if there is a “something” that is capable of being God, He can certainly make sense of our intentions as He knows them completely.

Fine, when I picture the Father He looks like Zeus. Or in my mind Jesus is always wearing a white robe and a blue sash. Is this considered idolatry to God because I’m actually supposed to have a more blind, unspecified intention toward a “god in general, whatever He may be?”

No. I believe God sorts out our intentions perfectly and accurately, knowing to who we are intending our belief, and that we are doing the best we can to meet Him on His terms.

I think that Derrida is correct if and only if one rejects the traditional idea of analogy. The idea of analogy claim that God’s idea of justice is analogous to ours, as is the rest of the divine attributes. Therefore, our idea of God is analogous to the way that God really is. The idea of analogy traditionally contained the idea that the careful believer can distinguish between an idol of God and God as he really is. A naive believer is simply not careful enough.

Matt,
Can you perhaps break down the distinction here, in both cases it seems as though the naive believer may be following an idol. Beyond that, I’m not quite clear on the distinction. Is it that Derrida considers the breaking of idols as a constant struggle and not a one-time thing?

Don’t all of us struggle all the time to distinguish God from our idols, or is that just me?

[...] idols of God, about which it might say a great deal. I’ve been thinking about this because the Derrida post I made a couple of days ago and the ensuing comments. To what extent do we try to make God either a replacement for, or an [...]

“Don’t all of us struggle all the time to distinguish God from our idols, or is that just me?”

Nope, it’s not just you.

That’s a relief then.

Derrida claims that one cannot know whether one is a real believer or a naive believer. Therefore, how can one know whether one is an atheist or a believer?

I deny that claim. Although a real believer may need to struggle to distinguish God from idols, his struggle will be successful. That is the difference between Derrida and myself. We can distinguish God from idols. We can know God.

The naive believer is overconfident. He does not recognize the possibility of being mistaken. Either he is not aware that he might believe in an idol, he does not believe that he could believe in one or he is not being careful enough. So although Derrida and I may be in agreement here, it is for different reasons.

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