Science and truth
2008 April 23
One thing I cannot understand about the debates around evolution is the claim that science, to be science, must restrict itself to materialistic hypotheses no matter what phenomena is to be studied.
I cannot think of any reasonable justification for this principle that is not, simply, atheistic.
If science is supposed to lead us to truth, how can one justify a priori ruling out the possibility that anything is the cause of a particular effect? If the thing ruled out was in fact the cause, we would never discover it through “science”.
Isn’t that a bass-ackwards way of going about inquiry?
While there is a great deal that science just does not know – in those realms I suppose it’s all agnostic – it just does not know. When science seeks to explain something, I suppose that it seeks (a la William of Ockham) the simplest, most direct explanation. If it can show that any phenomena is caused by strictly material means, there isn’t a need for a scientist to go beyond that.
In a number situations, science has attempted to investigate things like prayer in some sort of study. To my knowledge though, thus far the Almighty has been reticent about being put under a microscope.
In fact, no working scientist says “restrict itself to materialistic hypotheses” or asks “Is this supernatural? Is it material?” They just get on with the job.
This requires collecting data, advancing ideas and hypotheses, testing these experientially, developing theories, further testing and evaluation.
So nothing is excluded a priori.
The problem with the intelligent design people is that they won’t carry out this process (it’s called doing research). They wish to “infer” an explanation and leave it at that – no collection of data, refining of ideas, hypotheses and theories, and further validation and checking against reality.
That’s the problem. The ID people are restricting themselves to simple inference. Hence they exclude themselves from science.
Edit:
“In fact, no working scientist says “restrict itself to materialistic hypotheses” or asks “Is this supernatural? Is it material?” They just get on with the job.”
“This requires collecting data, advancing ideas and hypotheses, testing these experientially, developing theories, further testing and evaluation…
The problem with the intelligent design people is that they won’t carry out this process (it’s called doing research).”
I have a hard time taking your word for it, when http://biologicinstitute.org/research/, for example, lists a sampling of 25 articles published by intelligent design theorists.
“They wish to “infer” an explanation and leave it at that – no collection of data, refining of ideas, hypotheses and theories, and further validation and checking against reality.”
Well, inferring (a cause) is the same as validating theories (of explanations, which are causes), basically, so it’s a bit of a stretch to say they aren’t doing the latter when the words are synonymous. And clearly they are not restricting themselves to “simple” inference, since the very nature of inference is to infer a fact from another fact. Such “other” facts presuppose they have been researched, discovered, etc. So even your description of their method implies your evaluation of them is incorrect.
By itself “inferrence” stops short of testing against reality. That is the problem. The ID people don’t do any testing of ID iteself- no matter how many papers they might write (however, some of these, granted, are reasonable scientific papers – they just don’t test ID).
“By itself “inferrence” stops short of testing against reality.”
I really want to understand your argument here, but it’s difficult for me.
It seems to me that all reasoning goes through a process of observation and inference. It also is fairly obvious that the ID theorists have done some observation, or else they would not have written books on things like “irreducible complexity” and “the edge of evolution”. So, if by “testing” you mean observation of facts, as distinct from making inferences to the causes of those facts, I can’t see how ID theorists have not done this.
OK Andrew – consider “irreducible complexity”. This is something Behe infers from observing the biochemical complexity of living things. It also fits in with his ideological beliefs. (If it were shown to be a fact it would be a very important discovery).
However, Behe has stopped at this inference. He refuses to investigate it scientifically (by closely investigating systems he has inferred to be “irreducibly complex” by checking out possible mechanisms of evolution). Other people have done the work on systems he has proposed and shown how they did evolve – that they are not “irreducibly complex.”
Behe has refused to do the testing or validation and is left with a more and more unconvincing attitude of denial while scientists have got on and done the work – and published the research.
That is the nature of science. Unless you do the work there is no research to publish (in reputable journals). (And Behe therefore doesn’t have any credible research publication on this topic). If you only have an inference you have stopped half-way. If you won’t do the research you are left with publishing a (non-peer reviewed) book and selling it to people with the same world view who just want it confirmed – who are not really interested in science or evidence.
“However, Behe has stopped at this inference. He refuses to investigate it scientifically (by closely investigating systems he has inferred to be “irreducibly complex” by checking out possible mechanisms of evolution”
This assumes that a “scientific investigation” is one that refuses to stop with anything but a naturalistic explanation. This is exactly the methodological presupposition I was discussing in this post.
“Behe has refused to do the testing or validation and is left with a more and more unconvincing attitude of denial while scientists have got on and done the work – and published the research.”
Well, from the reading I have done, he has responded to these attempts to explain it naturalistically. So I have no reason to believe you.
Behe has made no investigation (I repeat scientists don’t start with a mantra – “Is this natural? Is this supernatural?” They get on and do the work, collect the evidence and test their theories against reality).
The fact is that other scientists have tested his “irreducible complexity” proposal against reality for the systems he mentioned – and found he was wrong!
Behe may have responded by refusing to accept published findings – but he has done absolutely no work on the problem. He hasn’t even advanced a specific hypothesis (natural or supernatural) to be tested.
Ken: I still have a problem with this; two comments up, you said the following:
So clearly what you have said is false. It seems to me what you really mean when you say he has done no investigation is “Behe has refused to withhold judgment that the complexity of the cell is intelligently caused until he finds a completely naturalistic explanation for the complexity he has discovered by investigation.” If that is the case, that is functionally “starting with a mantra” of “everything must be explained naturalistically.”
You do keep saying this, but I have no reason to take your word for it, since I have read him doing the things you say he hasn’t done (responding to specifically naturalistic responses which attempt to explain the complexity of the cell apart from any intelligent causation).
In one (or two) sense(s), he has not: he has not said that the natural complexity of the cell alone tells us the identity of the designer, or the designer’s means of creation.
On the other hand, in two senses he *has* advanced a specific hypothesis.
Firstly, he has said the data of complexity confirms the hypothesis that the cell was caused by an intelligence.
Secondly, he has also said he thinks the cause is God (not based on the design of the cell alone, but because of other, additional, reasons).
The fact that he has not advanced an hypothesis about the means the intelligent cause used to create the complex cell does not mean he has not advanced an hypothesis. He clearly has.
Ken:
I was thinking a bit more about your claim that Behe has advanced no hypothesis, and this occurred to me.
Take Paley’s famous watch. If I found Paley’s watch in a desert, I would (I think you’d agree) be justified in inferring that such an object was designed. Yet, I do not know the skills of watchmaking; I could not explain to you how the watchmaker made the watch. Yet, still, I think you’d have to agree I’d be justified in inferring that it was designed.
For the same reason, I don’t think you can criticize Behe’s inference for being unreasonable. His hypothesis is not “scientific” according to you essentially because he has not given a hypothesis about how the intelligent cause created the, e.g., bacterial flagellum; but that does nothing to affect the likely truth of his inference, just as it doesn’t in my (Paley’s
) watch scenario.
Andrew, an investigation is much more than an observation.
Behe is stuck with the argument from personal incomprehension or incredulity. He say things are too complicated for us to explain, to understand. So he goes no further.
Scientists are quite used to that feeling when they start their work. But they don’t let it stop them. They get on with their investigation, collect data, develop hypotheses, test them against reality, formulate theories, and continue testing and validating against reality.
It’s got nothing to do with “naturalist explanation” – we don’t ask that sort of question. It’s got to do with testable explanations.
The fact is that most ideas in science are wrong. We know that because we find that out by testing against reality. That is why we reject them, or develop them further, to come up with new hypotheses to test.
A never ending process bringing us ever close to the truth. Those, like Behe, who refuse to participate in this process have no hope of ever discovering the truth.
Behe stops with an assertion (of complexity). Not even a detailed hypothesis.
He just doesn’t want to go on with the testing – the real science. Presumably because he feels it might threaten his ideological beliefs.
“A never ending process bringing us ever close to the truth. Those, like Behe, who refuse to participate in this process have no hope of ever discovering the truth.”
This would be a good place for you to answer my question about the watch in the desert: why is the design inference likely to be true in spite of the fact that I don’t know how to make a watch, but not likely to be true in the case of the complex machinery of the cell? If it is likely in spite of not knowing mechanisms of formation, then allowing the possibility of a design inference de facto is still likely to get us to truth. In fact, it is more likely to get us to truth than never allowing a design inference, forever requiring us to continue looking for a cause that may never have existed (a blind watchmaker).
“He just doesn’t want to go on with the testing – the real science. Presumably because he feels it might threaten his ideological beliefs.”
Again, as far as I can see, his observations of the irreducible complexity of the cell count as “testing”. The only way they wouldn’t count as testing is if you required the hypothesis to be tested to be a materialistic one.
“He say things are too complicated for us to explain, to understand. So he goes no further.”
That’s not really fair to what he argues; he says attempting to explain the complexity of the cell on hypotheses besides intelligent causation (i.e., neo-Darwinian mechanisms) are far too improbable to be likely. The fact that this is part of his argument means that he goes beyond simply observing the cell. He takes the complexity of the cell as his data, and then compares possible explanations, and concludes with what he thinks is the best. He doesn’t just look at the cell and say “gee, this is too hard, I quit”. He comes to a conclusion based on eliminating less likely explanations.
If you call this “unscientific”, then I guess I don’t care, because it is reasonable and certainly likely to lead to truth (i.e., it is plain old vanilla abductive reasoning); if it isn’t regarded as “scientific” by the “mainstream”, then this only proves to me that the mainstream are rigging the definition of science to make the results only come out the way they want it.
To boil it all down: if it were, ex hypothesi, actually false that Darwinian mechanisms created life, the requirement that we keep testing, that we keep requiring that science look for Darwinian mechanisms of the genesis of life or else “we aren’t being scientific”, would ensure that science would never actually get us to the *truth* about the origins of life. If science is really open to the possibility that life came about by something other than Darwinistic mechanisms, it should not require that the only acceptable stopping place for investigation is a Darwinistic (i.e., comprehensive material) explanation. Just because a design inference does not give a complete material explanation of how life came to be, does not mean it is less likely to be true. If life did in fact come about as an act of an intelligent cause, a “science” which required only naturalistic hypotheses (tested and re-tested to the degree with which you would be satisfied, Ken) would never discover the truth.
And that’s why I asked my original question: if science is set up so that certain conclusions (e.g., inferences of intelligent design) are considered unscientific a priori, because they “don’t bother to do the research” (which means “don’t bother to refuse to infer design, and forever continue testing in the hopes that a material explanation will come along”), and those conclusions are actually the true conclusions, then I don’t care about science. I only care about science if science will tell me the truth. “Science” is only a means to an end.
Andrew – your inference of design about a watch is not true. it’s only an idea or hypothesis. We can then take that and test the idea or hypothesis against reality, find further evidence and eventually show that the watch was manufactured.
By itself the inference is only an idea – and is as likely to be wrong as any other idea. The science of the process tests the idea against reality and enables it to be falsified or verified.
By the observation is not testing.
Science would be in a very bad way indeed if it stopped at making inferences.
Just think – would you dare to board a plane knowing that it had been built only on the basis of inference – without testing ideas or hypotheses of aerodynamics to see if they did (or didn’t) confirm to reality?
There are no such things as “Darwinian mechanisms of the genesis of life.” Darwin didn’t propose anything on such matters. So obviously life did come about by mechanisms other than Darwinian ones.
“Andrew – your inference of design about a watch is not true. it’s only an idea or hypothesis.”
Well, its an hypothesis based on evidence (the watch, and what we know about design in general).
“By itself the inference is only an idea – and is as likely to be wrong as any other idea.”
An inference is not an “idea”, unless all mental operations are ideas.
“There are no such things as “Darwinian mechanisms of the genesis of life.” Darwin didn’t propose anything on such matters. So obviously life did come about by mechanisms other than Darwinian ones.”
He proposed mechanisms for the origin of the species; when these same mechanisms are extended to explain things like the origin of complexity in the cell, they are reasonably called “Darwinian”. I’m sure there are lots of things Darwinian mechanisms have been invoked for which Darwin never did specifically, yet its constantly done.
So quote me on Darwin’s mechanism for the genesis of life – the appearance of living entities. I can find you a reference but it clearly shows that Darwin was not postulating a mechanism for this.
Ken, you seem to have completely ignored my last paragraph, right before your response. I don’t really care what Darwin, the historical man, believed about anything. He’s not an authority for me.
My point is that his patterns of thinking have been extended beyond what he originally applied them to, and thus are reasonably named after him.
To justify your claim that “his patterns of thinking have been extended beyond what he originally applied them to” you need to refer to specific examples in Darwins writings.
My understanding is that Darwin’s contributions were mainly natural selection, sexual selection and work on the expression of emotion in animals. I agree there were some other areas were some valuable contributions were also made by him, but these are the major ones.
Now, if you are referring to other ideas in evolutionary science – refer to them as such. It is inappropriate to tie Darwin’s name to things such as the origins of life or (as Ben Stein is doing) to theories of gravity, etc. In science names have specific meanings.
Regarding the problem with the ID approach to science (the reliance on inference alone) I have written something in more detail (Intelligent design and scientific method) and welcome any comments you have on that. it is a key question underlying the “culture war.”
“In science names have specific meanings.”
Well, we’re not having this discussion in a science journal. In the wider culture, the Darwinian view of the world has to do with much more than just speciation.
I’m not sure how this discussion is productive.
Your use of “Darwinian” is not appropriate and really not accepted in the “wider culture” (of which I and other scientists are a part). But it is one that is being cynically promoted by the Wedge activists as part of their attack on society.
If you wish to make an honest contribution, or engage honestly with others in society, you should refrain from going along with this attempt to give such a malicious label to science. After all, Ben Stein, who is promoting this use, goes on to say “Science leads to killing people!” Are you happy to be identified with such an inhuman attitude.
If you wish to participate in debate and raise the issues you do about the scientific method then you should refrain from malicious use of terminology. Call a spade a spade then you might be understood. Giving your own interpretation to well established words does not help understanding – if that is what you want.
Otherwise you are just placing yourself firmly in Ben Stein’s camp with his dishonest attacks on humanities search for honestly understanding the world and improving our conditions.
“Your use of “Darwinian” is not appropriate and really not accepted in the “wider culture” (of which I and other scientists are a part).”
Ken, the wider culture recognizes that the concept of evolution is basically synonymous with Darwinism, and also recognizes that evolution is an understanding of the world contrary to many religious views. There’s nothing wrong with my use of the term Darwinian, notwithstanding your impassioned exhortations.
“After all, Ben Stein, who is promoting this use, goes on to say “Science leads to killing people!””
I’d be very surprised if Stein said that science simpliciter is leading us to kill people. In fact, I’m more likely to believe that you are deliberately distorting his intentions than that he said that. ID supporters, whatever you may think about them, believe they are being scientific, and certainly are not pro-killing people.
“Giving your own interpretation to well established words does not help understanding – if that is what you want.”
I’m not. This is the connotation that I have experienced my entire (public-system) educational life.
“Otherwise you are just placing yourself firmly in Ben Stein’s camp with his dishonest attacks on humanities search for honestly understanding the world and improving our conditions.”
I’m almost completely certain that it is you who are being dishonest in saying this about Stein, not he.
Have a look at John Derbyshire quotes Ben Stein.
Or look at this video (Science leads to killing people – according to Ben Stein) for a criticism of Stein’s tirade and lies.
Also, re your claim “the wider culture recognizes that the concept of evolution is basically synonymous with Darwinism” have a look at Google Trends comparions of usage of evolution and Darinims red Darwinism
Ken: I don’t have the capacity to watch the video at this point, so I’ll reserve comment, though from the blog post, it was interesting that the two offending comments were immediately preceded by ellipses…
Google Trends will tell you that naturalism and Darwinism are linked even though evolution and Darwinism are not. This shows that Darwinism is used to name a kind of philosophical thinking that is strongly linked to a openly naturalized evolutionary theory while evolution is used more as a term for a scientific theory.
As to quotations of Ben Stein, I do not see the relevance. Andrew was arguing about the nature of ID and science. He was not claiming to defend everything Ben Stein had ever said. Ben Stein’s comments are not relevant to the popular use of the word “Darwinian”, what ID is, or what ID proponents think. If you wish to quote leaders of the ID movement, then quote Dembski, Behe, Johnson, Steven Meyer and the like.
My point is that “Darwinism” is used maliciously as a label to discredit science – an -ism like communism, fascism, feminism. That is, it converts science into a political movement – which is obviously wrong. Darwinism, Darwinist, etc., is generally used by those (like Stein) who attack evolutionary science – not by scientists working in this area (Although they will often use “Darwinian” to refer to the mechanism of natural selection – often necessary because other mechanism are often considered).
I understand why you should want to dissociate yourself from Stein – he is rather nasty! However, he, his film and the film’s slanderous assertions, are being backed by the Wedge people – including Dembski and the Disco people.
Mathew – I have made comments above on Behe’s claims. They are what should be looked at for any scientific assessment of ID.
Andrew’s response has been to avoid the issue. For example he claims as proof that there is ID research:
“I have a hard time taking your word for it, when http://biologicinstitute.org/research/, for example, lists a sampling of 25 articles published by intelligent design theorists.”
Have a look at these papers. Most of them may be good scientific papers – but they are not about intelligent design – they don’t describe work investigating ID.
This is a common tactic of ID people to list such publications as evidence of work on ID when they are in fact not. It’s called deception.
“My point is that “Darwinism” is used maliciously as a label to discredit science – an -ism like communism, fascism, feminism.”
This seems to imply that science is by definition evolutionary; otherwise, attacking “Darwinistic science” as an ism could not be considered as ipso facto attacking science per se.
“Andrew’s response has been to avoid the issue.”
Interesting you would accuse me of that, when you quote me responding to your “issue”. If my response isn’t right, that’s fine; but you can’t say I avoided you.
“They are what should be looked at for any scientific assessment of ID.”
This assumes that the only “scientific assessment” worthy of the name is one which tries to discover materialistic explanations for the appearance of intelligent design, which once again betrays a biased conception of what science is for in the first place.
In order for the accusations present in the film to be slanderous, they first have to be false. Since your only quotes of Ben Stein have been of matters outside the film, you have not shown that there are any such accusations.
Although I know what “the Wedge people” is supposed to refer to, what is “the Disco people” supposed to refer to? If you are trying to refer to the intelligent design movement, then just use that label.
Finally, you claim that such papers do not investigate ID theory. I have already posted on what ID means. One of the things that it means is a heuristic (research program). That is how it is being used in those papers. It is also what they claim they are doing in their description. There is no deception involved. Andrew was only using this as an example that ID people do research. This link shows that they do.
Oh, btw, Matt:
This might be off-topic now but I posted a reply to your comments about Christ’s perfection at my blog.
If you’re interested, check it out!
Sorry. Wrong thread. Please remove previous comment.
Science, at least by my definition, study the workings of the PHYSICAL.
This is what I find to be the biggest problem with teaching creationism(or intelligent design if you prefer) is that the theory itself requires its followers to believe in something supernatural. And since we don’t teach our children about Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy, I see no reason to teach them about anything else supernatural.
I think it is arbitrary and nonsensical to limit the field of science only to the physical. If the realm of the physical has its causal explanation (or at least some of the realm) in something beyond the physical, one could never fully understand the physical realm without understanding that which is beyond it. If science is ultimately motivated by the desire to understand even just the physical realm completely, it should be open to any causal explanations until it is conclusively demonstrated that they are false.
And I should add that some contemporary non-theistic theories of the origin of the physical universe functionally appeal to the supernatural: the most 0bvious example being the multiverse theory (as I mentioned here: http://civitatedei.wordpress.com/2008/08/15/faith-and-the-multiverse-hypothesis/)
“I think it is arbitrary and nonsensical to limit the field of science only to the physical”.
Andrew, I really would like to reignite this discussion if possible because I think it’s so important.
My initial reaction when I read what you say is that there is something problematic with this. In fact, I see it as contradictory. The thing is, science doesn’t really limit its field to the physical, it limits its field to what can be sensed—if you want to call this ‘physical,’ fair enough; but that thereby doesn’t preclude God from science; it only states that if God wishes to be included in science or scientific observation and explanation he has introduce himself to its scope in regards to the particular way it wishes to see, i.e., so as to make himself available to the senses. What you have said seems to me to be saying that ‘I think it is arbitrary and nonsensical to limit the field of science only to that which can be sensed.’ The implication would thereby seem to be that you think that science should incorporate a non-sensical means whereby to appropriate information. But what would this means be? Inasmuch as science is about that which can be apprehended by the senses it is physical—thus things not ‘physical’ should not be included. In other words, science doesn’t arbitrarily exclude God or the supernatural from its purview, it only states that if God wishes to be apart of that he must wear a certain clothing so to speak. If God however does not choose to make himself available to the senses, nothing in science can ever determine that God does not exist or that he is somehow a part of that causal operations involved in natural phenomena.
I think the problem you will ultimately have to face (and that scientists want you to face) is actually showing that the physical has its causal explanation in something beyond the physical. In this case, you will functionally be saying that the reason such and such is the case is for no reason—since if it is beyond the physical it cannot thereby be identified by any physical means. To show this is very difficult to do, since it can always be conjectured that we don’t know enough about the subject at the present time, i.e., that there is an unseen physical explanation. In other words, that something can’t be explained right now is never a reason to defer to supernatural explanation; though neither is it reason not to defer to supernatural explanation. The causal explanation, really, remains to be seen—if it will be shown at all. And I think the reason there might some reason to exclude God as a possible explanation is that in history unexplainable issues eventually became explainable with regard to the physical.
What I cannot understand is why Christians (not all) feel there is a need for God to fit in some causal nexus of the scientific world. Why is it necessary for God to exist, etc., for there to be explanations which have recourse to the unexplainable?
“The thing is, science doesn’t really limit its field to the physical, it limits its field to what can be sensed—if you want to call this ‘physical,’ fair enough; but that thereby doesn’t preclude God from science; it only states that if God wishes to be included in science or scientific observation and explanation he has introduce himself to its scope in regards to the particular way it wishes to see, i.e., so as to make himself available to the senses.”
Two things:
1) We’re stipulating here what “science” is. Etymologically speaking it’s just about “knowledge”. We have come, by custom, to limit to “knowledge about the physical/sensible”. That’s fine, if we want to define the word that way. But it doesn’t mean it is sensible to do so in a strict way (so as to exclude any other aspect of reality from being causally connected to the physical or sensible).
2) To speak of making somethint “available to the senses” is ambiguous. Things can be “available” in different ways. Something can be directly perceived, and thus be available in that way. Or things can be available as causes are evident in their effects, by inference from perceived things. A non-controversial way in which this is true is that the present implies the past, though the past is not directly available to the senses. If we’re going to be so strict to define science as the study of “what is *directly* available to the senses”, we must never allow the past to be relevant to our current observations, never appeal to past events as explanations for present sensations, since by definition the past cannot be seen. It does not exist in the present.
“In this case, you will functionally be saying that the reason such and such is the case is for no reason—since if it is beyond the physical it cannot thereby be identified by any physical means.”
This seems to me to be begging the question: it equates something having no cause with something having a non-physical cause, which is just to assume the non-physical does not exist. Why begin an endeavour in search for the truth ruling out a possibility a priori? That doesn’t seem like a wise course of action if our ultimate goal is the truth, not just explanations consistent with our prejudices.
“In other words, that something can’t be explained right now is never a reason to defer to supernatural explanation; though neither is it reason not to defer to supernatural explanation.”
I was thinking of writing a post on this specific issue, and maybe I might. At this point I’ll just say I don’t agree with this argument for one basic reason: if the natural world as a whole, from its origins, seems to imply design intuitively, and design is the effect of a mind (or minds), then there’s a good reason to think there is something outside of nature (the cosmos) that is the cause of the cosmos.
“And I think the reason there might some reason to exclude God as a possible explanation is that in history unexplainable issues eventually became explainable with regard to the physical.”
Well, really what history has told us is that for some things we previously did not have a physical explanation for, we have now gained such explanations, and some things we did not have explanations for we still do not have explanations for. But I think there’s something problematic with this argument: we’re inducing from the history of science what the rest of the history of science must be like, as if history is operating according to either (a) some divinely predestined goal, or (b) some kind of impersonal Hegelian logic. Either way doesn’t prove helpful for methodological naturalism.
“What I cannot understand is why Christians (not all) feel there is a need for God to fit in some causal nexus of the scientific world. Why is it necessary for God to exist, etc., for there to be explanations which have recourse to the unexplainable?”
I confess, I found this statement a bit shocking. I mean, with a well placed ellipsis, you could be quoted as asking: “What I cannot understand is why Christians (not all) feel there is a need… for God to exist… ?” But as a simple answer, I think the reason they feel it is necessary is because of Genesis 1: whatever it says, it says God is the cause of the “heavens and the earth”. The rest of the Bible absolutely confirms this everywhere (i.e., insofar as it says God is the creator, it says this). Beyond this, it seems to frequently say that God intervenes in the course of history, implying there are more events than creation which are ultimately explicable by reference to God, and not something less than God.
Personally, I blame William Paley
Seriously Paley (of the famous “watchmaker” argument for God’s existence) is a specimen of sort of 18th and 19th Century apologist who stressed design arguments as a primary reason for believing Christianity. It’s probably little coincidence that such arguments developed in the same milieu that churns out all kinds of Deists – this is the age of the mechanistic clockwork universe. What is fascinating is that design arguments of one sort or another have become among the most popular ones for the defense of Christian belief. If one examines other epochs of Christianity, one can see that this was not always the case. Design arguments have been around for a long time but I would argue that they’ve never had the sort of primacy that they have in popular apologetics today. This is problematic in ways that I might like to unpack in a proper post on the matter.
Dan,
I was actually thinking of posting a thought-experiment along the lines of Paley’s watch.
I think the reason the argument has been around for a long time is its intuitive plausibility, unlike say the ontological argument, which seems intuitively implausible to many people (though notoriously difficult to actually refute). The moral argument is similar: it is popular because it is simple to grasp and persuasive to many people. The cosmological arguments require more reflection (on why infinite regresses are problematic, etc.), and thus are less popular among people who haven’t or don’t have the time to develop the capacities to understand such points, I think.
“[I]t doesn’t mean [defining science as such] is sensible to do so in a strict way (so as to exclude any other aspect of reality from being causally connected to the physical or sensible) . . . To speak of making somethint “available to the senses” is ambiguous. Things can be “available” in different ways. Something can be directly perceived, and thus be available in that way. Or things can be available as causes are evident in their effects, by inference from perceived things.”
1) I am not not trying to incorporate all of reality into what can be called “science”—I think the question I am trying to suggest is, how do you suppose or even propose to talk about the non-physical? You have a problem doing that! But you want to include God into the discussion—a discussion which has stipulated that only physical items are presently allowed into discussion.
2) the “that-which-is-available-to-the-senses” I intentionally meant as ambiguous—that it, is I want to include both physical entities not directly present to the senses though inferrable from them and physical entities directly present to the senses. There is no reason for me to be specific. And there is no a priori reason I ought to think that that which is inferrable is God over and above a potentially less understood physical entity. I mean, to reduce it to a “naked-eye” brand of sensation, of course, is not what I properly mean either—I expect there to be sensation-excellerants, i.e., telescopes, microscopes, chemical detectors, etc., apparatuses.
Surely the past is not present to the senses but the memories are and that is the past-present link. Now we can quibble all we want about how we really can trust these recollections, so on and so on, but no one is really going to doubt in the main that recollection is an access to the past or that it cannot be trusted in part. I don’t think that any scientist is really being that strict. That is more a philosopher’s issue.
“[I]t equates something having no cause with something having a non-physical cause, which is just to assume the non-physical does not exist.”
You’re wrong about this, and I think you’ve misunderstood me, since you would be thereby assuming that I think only physical things exist. But that is not what I am saying, so I must conclude that your reading of me is not as charitable as it could have been. I’ll try to clarify nonetheless.
1) It is not inconsistent to assume that there are things which cannot be spoken about in terms of physicalities (Kant with his things-in-themselves should have taught us that; or even Pierce, who said there was a difference between things that were actual and thing which existed).
2) I would like to see (independent of the very first thing which supposed came into existence) someone attempt to show that something physical can have no cause. So why I have to conclude that something which cannot be spoken of necessarily cannot exist is beyond me. The point I am making is that once you have restricted the conversation to that which is physical, to introduce into it a non-physical entity is to put forth a nonsensical, non-physical claim—hence something without reason, without meaning *inasmuch as the conversation goes* (not without meaning or reason generally which is how you are interpreting me)—which was supposed to be thereby excluded from the discussion. Hence it does not function as any proper explanation inasmuch as the conversation is concerned—whether or not (and this is the important part) there is an actual referent to the non-physical entity. Thus it has nothing to do with “ruling out something a priori” because it has only to do with physical entities—not all entities—so it is a ruling out only of non-physical entities. God is more than welcome to effect whatsoever he likes, but if he wishes to be part of the spectrum of science (in its modern sense, if it will make you feel better) he must incorporate himself into the physical. In other words, God is irrelevant to the scientific discussion unless he can make himself observable to it. If he wishes not to, we cannot then say he does not exist. And if he does not want to, we cannot say that he does exist.
“I was thinking of writing a post on this specific issue, and maybe I might. At this point I’ll just say I don’t agree with this argument for one basic reason: if the natural world as a whole, from its origins, seems to imply design intuitively, and design is the effect of a mind (or minds), then there’s a good reason to think there is something outside of nature (the cosmos) that is the cause of the cosmos.”
Your argument will have to demonstrate that design is only possible through a designer and is not a fundamental condition of existence. And that I don’t think you can do without bringing God in through the back door. Even if there is an unexplainable complexity to simple structures it doesn’t follow that there is a creator behind them, it may only follow that basic structures have a fundamental complexity to them. It is only when you add the presupposition that ‘it is not possible for there to be basic complexity without the hand of God’ that you’ll reach your conclusion. But then you’ll have to demonstrate that. However at the same time, and luckily for the theist, a basic fundamental complexity does not exclude God either.
Paley’s analogy is not comparable at all (I bring this in because it was of discussion above and in case you wanted to further argue about design). Thinking that there is design in the world is not like finding a watch and wondering, because of its mechanics, about its creator. If you really want a comparable analogue you’ll have to suppose that it would be like the minute hand of a watch thinking that because there is a second hand which moves that the whole thing in which they are contained must have a designer. Of course that doesn’t really work, or certianly not as well. The presupposition that we can observe the world as whole from within it, as though we were without it, is just from the beginning wrongheaded. But it’s what Paley assumed. Humans might design things but our understanding of their being designed is largely because we can point to designers and the things they design, but the universe doesn’t have a designer we can point to (physically speaking) and therefore we cannot really determine whether it is a thing designed. Order in its parts itself will not tell whether the whole thing is ordered or whether order at all is a necessary condition of there being a God. Because if there is no God, and there is order, then order itself must be a fundamental condition of existence.
“But I think there’s something problematic with this argument: we’re inducing from the history of science what the rest of the history of science must be like, as if history is operating according to either (a) some divinely predestined goal, or (b) some kind of impersonal Hegelian logic. Either way doesn’t prove helpful for methodological naturalism.”
Well it is not really a history of science that I am so much concerned with which informs what the present *might be* (not must—no scientist is going to concede to your ‘must’) like, inasmuch as it is about past events dictaing how we think about present and future events. Inasmuch, as that is the case I don’t see what the problem is. Sure, quote some version of the problem of induction to me, that’s really not going to assist with how we generally operate. We don’t exclude the problem of induction either! That present events will presumably be like past ones is not an altogether bad idea—it’s essentially what gets me across the street when I am not at the lights. I recognize this could be the time when I do not succeed, but I am still allowing the past to dictate the future in some regard. I don’t see how it shouldn’t be included as part of methodology just because it is not completely philosophically tight. I also think that science does allow also that such a principle will not always follow. So to assume that an explanation could come about for which God is not needed is alright to assume from the fact that similar situations have happened in the past. Though granted, it should not be absolutely expected that it will. I don’t understand why you are disagreeing with me.
“I confess, I found this statement a bit shocking. I mean, with a well placed ellipsis, you could be quoted as asking: “What I cannot understand is why Christians (not all) feel there is a need… for God to exist… ?” But as a simple answer, I think the reason they feel it is necessary is because of Genesis 1: whatever it says, it says God is the cause of the “heavens and the earth”. The rest of the Bible absolutely confirms this everywhere (i.e., insofar as it says God is the creator, it says this). Beyond this, it seems to frequently say that God intervenes in the course of history, implying there are more events than creation which are ultimately explicable by reference to God, and not something less than God.”
It is not exactly clear to me why you commented about the ellipsis, unless you are certain that of everything you have said you cannot possibly be quoted (with an equally well-placed ellipsis) as saying something equally strange or absurd. I am curious about your motivation behind it but will not speculate.
Let me explain it a little bit differently, perhaps that will help. I think my question is that if it is truly better (from the position of Christianity) for natural phenomena to be explained by recourse to God, why not reject the current ideas concerning thunderstorms, for instance, and take up a causal idea that states that God is angry or bowling or something else? Or why not create explanations for natural phenomenon which have recourse to God though which have been for the most part explained naturally: like God bats the earth around the sun like a tether ball. Why is there a need for God to be an explanation at all? The point is, there is this idea that the less natural phenomena can be explained by God the worse shape theists are in. But, I fundamentally disagree with this (at least inasmuch as Christianity is concerned). I can think that God is the cause of everything without having to believe that individual items in the universal network are caused by him at any given time. Or I can assume that he is the ground of the cause of all things, however, the appearances of which always look as though they were the cause of other natural phenomena. In other words, I can except with little problem that God is truly the cause of every little thing and therefore be consistent with the bible and hence read it just as you do; though on the surface maintain that the causal relations looks quite naturalistic without actually only being so. I can be content with the fact that it is just something I can’t fathom and leave it at that. But you’ll have to assume your way of reading it—in order to exclude mind—is the only possible way to read it. But that is not acceptable by me.
To look at the universe as many Christians do and expect that there have to be or there should be holes in order for God to poke his head through seems to be the product of anxiety not faith. The thing which you defend, if you let go of does not disprove the ground of your belief. I must therefore ask why it is you argue for it. Because you really believe there to be these “scientific peculiarities” which point to God? I have hard time believing that is truly the motivating factor. Moreover, it must be truly interesting to you that I can believe in evolution and accept naturalistic explanations without being an atheist or while still being a Theist. In other words, I don’t deny what you say of Genesis 1, I don’t think it needs to be taken so simplistically however which is something I think you’re here assuming. (The Bible says that God has a hand, should I believe that he has one? Of course not. It is more complex than that. Should we expect other complexities? Of course.) In other words, I can believe that God is the cause of all natural phenomena—which I do—but I cannot tell you how he does it or how it works. That much I don’t think has been given. But are you going to blame me for that, or denounce my Christianity as worthless because it does not seek to explain phenomenon without recourse to God? Probably not. So I don’t quite understand the motivation or the need to feel that God is literally a causal factor. I’ll quote Berkeley, “Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run into absurdities and contradictions; out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.”
John,
I’m going to move my reply to a new post, but I wanted to apologize to you here; you are right, I was not reading you charitably in several places. I don’t have an excuse, but the reason was probably that it was late and I was tired. Please forgive me for my crankiness.