Science and truth II
From the comments:
When science seeks to explain something, I suppose that it seeks (a la William of Ockham) the simplest, most direct explanation. If it can show that any phenomena is caused by strictly material means, there isn’t a need for a scientist to go beyond that.
This is not quite what I mean. It’s one thing to conclude a scientific investigation and say a material cause is simpler than an immaterial cause; it’s another to start out with the presupposition that no phenomena was the result of an immaterial cause, and do all research from that foundation.
Intelligent design, for example, has been all about looking for the simplest explanation, and that’s precisely the reason they say some features of nature are more simply explained by inferring an intelligent cause (divine or otherwise, as panspermia would be an instance of intelligent causation) than by requiring an explanation on the principles of random variation + natural selection only. It uses the principle of parsimony precisely to argue against pure materialism.
And theologically speaking (and a theological reason is the only one that could be given for such an a priori), I see no reason to presume God would create/act in such a way as to deliberately remove any evidence of his existence and involvement. Certainly Paul didn’t think he did any such thing:
Romans 1:19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.
About the prayer studies: as far as I have heard, there have been established correlations between prayer and wellness.
Can you quote any research paper which includes a statement amounting to starting “out with the presupposition that no phenomena was the result of an immaterial cause.”
No!
Science starts out with the evidence. Words like “material” and Immaterial” are not of any use in such an investigation – they just lead to dogmatic rules.
“Can you quote any research paper which includes a statement amounting to starting “out with the presupposition that no phenomena was the result of an immaterial cause.””
It’s a bit simplistic to think that working scientists would restate their entire theoretical framework for doing science in every experiment. If it’s an assumed framework for most people, then there’s no need to explicitly state it.
“Intelligent design, for example, has been all about looking for the simplest explanation, and that’s precisely the reason they say some features of nature are more simply explained by inferring an intelligent cause (divine or otherwise, as panspermia would be an instance of intelligent causation) than by requiring an explanation on the principles of random variation + natural selection only. It uses the principle of parsimony precisely to argue against pure materialism.”
Heck no. Occam’s razor says not to propagate entities beyond that which is required. It is used to evaluate two theories that have similar evidence to back them up. ID propagates a huge entity and attempts to say that this is parsimonious because it eliminates the chain of events that evolution requires. On the other hand, when we examine the evidence, we see that all of the mechanisms needed for evolution have been demonstrated to occur. ID proponents can’t even say for sure where their entity intervened and when, and if it was one time or many. Saying ID is parsimonious is like saying that my claim that you all are a hallucination that I am suffering is parsimonious. Sure, it eliminates a lot of complexity, but is not consistent with the evidence.
Oh, and evolution is not just variation + natural selection. But that’s a side point.
“ID propagates a huge entity and attempts to say that this is parsimonious because it eliminates the chain of events that evolution requires.”
No, it doesn’t. It says nothing necessary about the identity of the designer. It only infers that an intelligent cause is more parsimonious than natural selection and random variation (which is what Darwinism boils down to in the context of this debate).
“On the other hand, when we examine the evidence, we see that all of the mechanisms needed for evolution have been demonstrated to occur.”
That would be disputed.
“ID proponents can’t even say for sure where their entity intervened and when, and if it was one time or many.”
Which is irrelevant to their point. All they need to establish is that it is simpler to invoke an intelligent cause than natural variation + random selection. That is a sufficient explanation for the empirical phenonema. They do not need to provide an explanation of the explanation to have provided a good first explanation. If we always need to explain our explanations, then we’d have an infinite regress.
I might also point out that scientists have not always chosen the simplest explanation. Copernicus is a great example of this. He believed that the earth went around the sun even though:
1) His explanation was as complex (both mathematically and verbally) as the Ptolemaic model
2) His model violated the physics of time, while the Ptolemaic model did not
3) There was no observational evidence to support his theory
4) His theory had been advanced before and rejected
He believed that his theory was right because it did have one advantage. It unified several facts that lacked a unifying explanation under the Ptolemaic model. That is it.
Since Copernicus’ position was not consistent with the evidence, perhaps it should have been rejected. What do you think?
I meant that he violated the physics of that time (not the physics of time itself).